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Abstract: Energy efficiency programmes (EEPs) are schemes operated by utilities or other bodies in
order to incentivize energy efficiency improvement, in particular by adoption of energy-efficient prod-
ucts and typically by means of an economic reward. Ample experience has been gained, especially in
the U.S., where EEPs have been in use for decades, with the rationale of avoiding additional energy
supply by improving energy efficiency. More recently, EEPs have been implemented in Europe
and in Switzerland. This review paper presents insights from the U.S., the EU and especially from
Switzerland, with a focus on levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC) as a key performance
indicator. These LPC values, which take the perspective of the programme operator, are typically low
to very low compared to the cost of electricity supply, thereby representing an important argument
in favour of their use. The country examples show that EEPs are being effectively and successfully
put into practice, for example, in Switzerland both as (i) a national tender-based scheme (called
ProKilowatt) and in the form of a (ii) utility-operated obligation-based scheme (in Geneva). EEPs not
only call for diligent implementation but also for suitable legal settings, e.g., in the form of mandatory
energy efficiency savings targets (as realised for energy efficiency obligations, EEOs) in combination
with programme cost recovery. The main criticism of EEPs is the free-rider effect, which needs to
be minimised. On the other hand, EEPs are accompanied by significant co-benefits (environmental,
health-related and social) and spillover effects. In their currently prevalent form, EEPs allow one to
effectively save energy at a (very) low cost (“low-hanging fruit”). They can hence play an important
role in fostering the energy transition; however, they should be implemented as part of a policy
portfolio, in combination with other policy instruments.
Keywords: energy efficiency; energy efficiency programmes (EEP), cost-effectiveness; free-rider
effect; co-benefits
1. Introduction
Across the globe, both the supply of renewable energy and energy conservation are key
components of national energy and climate policy strategies [1–4]. Energy conservation
can be achieved by increased energy efficiency (i.e., by using less energy for the same
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energy service) and by sufficiency (i.e., by reducing the demand for energy services [5]).
Improved energy efficiency is a core strategy in the European Union (represented by the
EU’s principle of “energy efficiency first” [6,7]), in Switzerland (as part of the “Energy
Strategy 2050” [8]), in the U.S. (where it is part of the so-called Integrated Resource Planning
process of utilities; see, e.g., [9]) and elsewhere. In high-income countries with typically low
economic growth, improved energy efficiency may allow one to avoid a rise in energy use;
and according to numerous scenarios, it is expected to even enable a significant decrease in
energy demand, which is often considered a prerequisite for achieving carbon neutrality
under the Paris Agreement [10]. Apart from its contribution to the abatement of greenhouse
gas emissions and the direct economic benefits associated with cost-effective measures,
energy efficiency improvement results in numerous co-benefits, e.g., jobs, reduced energy
bills, lower energy dependency and lower environmental impacts [11–13]. While the value
of energy efficiency is widely acknowledged, it remains a challenge to exploit its potential.
The main barriers to the adoption of economically attractive and socially desirable energy
efficiency measures (EEM)—i.e., of concrete technical measures (e.g., LED lighting) or
organisational measures (e.g., “good housekeeping”)—are the presence of market failures,
behavioural anomalies and other factors [14–21]. More efforts and more effective polices
are required also because the rate of energy efficiency improvement is insufficient and
seems to have been decreasing in recent years, with further with further setbacks due to
the Covid-19 pandemic [1,2]). There are a number of policy options to promote energy
efficiency, for example, compulsory energy audits, labelling, increased energy taxation,
differentiated product taxation (bonus malus approaches) and enhanced implementation
of minimum energy performance standards. The present review paper aims to answer the
questions of whether energy efficiency programmes (EEP) are a suitable way to promote
energy efficiency improvements and whether policy makers should more actively make
use of EEPs.
1.1. What Are Energy Efficiency Programmes (EEP)?
EEPs represent a category of policy instruments that incentivize the uptake of energy-
efficient solutions. Typically, energy programmes provide financial incentives (subsidies
and/or rebates) and services (free-of-charge equipment; free installation of energy effi-
ciency measures) in combination with information and awareness-raising campaigns (e.g.,
billing disclosure programmes) and/or capacity building (e.g., training for installers, en-
ergy managers and other contractors) in order to promote increased use of technological
solutions and energy saving behaviour. EEPs aim to reduce the energy needed for the
targeted energy services (e.g., lighting, heating or cooling) by increasing the market uptake
of more energy efficient products (devices; appliances) and/or by the adoption of more
energy-efficient practices (see, e.g., [22,23]). While also falling under the broad category of
energy programmes, demand response programmes (DRP) can be seen as a complementary
approach to energy efficiency programmes (EEP). EEPs focus on energy savings, whereas
DRPs aim to shift the demand load to other time periods in order to better match energy
supply and energy demand.
EEPs primarily address the uptake of readily available, commercialised options, and
they do not primarily or explicitly aim for indirect effects, e.g., R&D. Today, EEPs are
applied to all sectors, from the private to commercial and industrial, and in principle, to all
types of energy carriers. Though EEPs are implemented across the globe, the importance
given to such policy measures differs across countries.
1.2. Why Re-Analyse the Value of EEPs, and How Can It Be Done?
Energy utilities are operating EEPs in more than 50 jurisdictions around the world,
in the context of public policy strategies, implemented by means of energy efficiency
obligations or energy efficiency resource standards [24]. However, energy systems and
energy policies differ across locations and they evolve, calling for continual assessment
of a chosen policy mix. Robust data are scarce and become available only occasionally—
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when they do, they offer new opportunities for critical assessment. While Switzerland
has influenced energy policy in other countries—for example with its energy efficiency
networks [25] or the European Energy Award [26] that was initially a Swiss scheme)—the
Swiss experience with EEPs is hardly present in the scientific literature. The present paper
closes this gap by means of a critical review for Switzerland, while putting the insights
gained into the context of other countries and drawing policy conclusions.
2. Materials and Methods
The present review paper is based on reports and peer-reviewed scientific papers. We
make use of both qualitative and quantitative information serving to answer the research
questions specified above. Given the importance of cost-effectiveness as a criterion when
evaluating EEPs, we extracted relevant data from the reviewed studies and made them
comparable using the parameters/variables defined in Figure 1 and Table 1. The general
equation of levelised cost is given in the top part of Table 1. The lower sections of Table
1 present the levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC, as an indicator for the
leverage effect of funds invested in EEPs) and levelised total cost of saved energy (LTC, as
an indicator for the total cost of the EEP), which is typically dominated by the cost of the
technical EEM—in Figure 1 denoted as total costs of energy efficiency Measures, TEEM).
We thereby did not correct for the different approaches applied in the various sources
when establishing energy savings (compare [27–29]) and costs (for example, we did not
harmonize the assumptions made for discount rates and lifetimes; compare also EPA [30]).
Some of the sub-questions raised by this paper are whether sufficient experience has
been acquired to date and what the outcomes have been (Section 3); what the strengths and
weaknesses of this policy instrument are; how one should assess EEPs in a broader context
(Section 4); and finally, which conclusions to draw for policy makers, policy analysts and
researchers (Section 5).
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Table 1. Levelised cost indicators used for the evaluation of EEPs.
Indicators Ref.
Levelized cost of Saved Energy
Levelized cost = Invest·AF+Operational costsannual−Avoided energy related costsannualEnergy savedannual
Invest: Investment costs
AF: Annuity Factor
Operational costs: e.g., costs related to maintenance
Avoided energy related costs: e.g., avoided fuel costs due to energy savings
[31]
LPC—Levelized Program Cost of Saved Energy
Levelized Program Cost = Program costsEnergy savedsimple
Program costs = Costs o f EEP = (Administration costs) + (Financial incentives)
Energy saved = (Energy consumed by old device)− (Energy consumed by new device)
LTC — Levelized Total Cost of Saved Energy
Levelized Total Costsimple =
Total costssimple
Energy savedsimple
Comparison to old Total costssimple = Total costs o f new deviceEnergy saved =
(Energy consumed by old device)− (Energy consumed by new device) [30]
Levelized Total Costre f erence =
Total costsre f erence
Energy savedre f erence
Comparison to standard
Total costsre f erence = (Total costs o f new device)−
(Total costs o f standard device)Energy savedre f erence =
(Energy consumed by standard device)− (Energy consumed by new device)
Levelized Total Costadvanced =
Total costsadvanced
Energy savedadvanced
Comparison to standard plus age
Total costsadvanced = (Total costs o f new device)−
(Total costs o f standard device) + (Remaining present value o f old device)
a) During lifetime of old device:
Energy saved =
(Energy consumed by old device)− (Energy consumed by new device)
b) After remaining lifetime of old device:
Energy saved =
(Energy consumed by standard device)− (Energy consumed by new device)
[30]
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3. Results—Learnings from Existing EEPs
In the past, numerous countries have–not rarely, but sporadically–set up energy
efficiency programmes, often partly or even primarily driven by the objective of boosting
demand for a certain category of goods (e.g., for boilers and cars in France; Tamma [32]). In
their report on market-based instruments for energy efficiency, the IEA reviewed auction-
based and obligation schemes for nearly forty countries or federal states, most of which
were in the U.S. and Europe [24]. Insights on characteristics and best practices for designing
and implementing obligation schemes in a total of more than 30 jurisdictions around the
globe were compiled by both the Regulatory Assistance Project [33] and ENSPOL [34], and
for Europe by Bertoldi et al. [35], Giraudet and Finon [36] or in the projects ENSMOV [37]
and again ENSPOL [38].
The objective of this section is to update and to complement these studies by presenting
in somewhat more depth the situation in a limited number of countries. In these, EEPs
have been implemented for several years or even decades, for which a suitable legal basis
is typically a prerequisite. As will be explained below, this is the case for a number of states
in the U.S., and more recently, for some EU member states and for Switzerland. The critical
review presented in this paper is based on the learnings from EEPs in these countries.
3.1. Switzerland (CH)
In Switzerland, no EEO scheme is in place at the national level, but there is a national
tender-based electricity saving scheme called ProKilowatt. In addition, there are very few
EEPs at the cantonal level, though there is one in Geneva. In the following, we first discuss
ProKilowatt and then the EEP in the canton of Geneva.
3.1.1. ProKilowatt
The objective of the national tender-based energy saving scheme called ProKilowatt is
to support electricity saving measures which could not be implemented without subsidies
due to insufficient economic viability. ProKilowatt has been running since 2010, with its
total subsidy volume now approaching 50 million CHF per year (SFAO, 2019). These
funds originate from a small levy which must not exceed 0.1 CH cents (1 CHF = 1.01
USD = 0.899 EUR in 2019 [39]) per kWh of sold electricity according to the current Swiss
Energy Law [40]. ProKilowatt funds two types of instruments, i.e., so-called programmes
and projects: The objective of programmes is the large-scale implementation of similar
individual electricity saving measures in companies, other organisations (e.g., hospitals,
schools) and households, e.g., related to lighting, heating (circulation pumps, HVAC),
appliances (e.g., induction ovens, laundry dryers) or compressed air. Projects, on the
other hand, address single measures in companies or other organisations, with investment
volumes of at least around 70,000 CHF per project. Examples are the replacement of motors
in the manufacturing industry and measures related to refrigeration, compressed air, drying
and lighting in any sector. The ProKilowatt administration organizes calls for tenders to
which EEP operators (e.g., utilities, engineering firms or other types of ESCOs) respond
with their proposals for programmes and projects. These are checked and ranked by the
ProKilowatt administration in terms of their cost-effectiveness (measured by determining
LPC, i.e., dividing the requested budget by the estimated electricity savings according to the
tender). When preparing the tender, the EEP operator can freely choose the subsidised share
of the investment cost. Since the EEP operators do not know how many programmes and
projects will be submitted and how cost-effective the competing submissions are, the most
rational strategy for them is to request the lowest possible subsidy share and to optimize
their cost-effectiveness. According to ProKilowatt rules, the maximum subsidy level is
30% of the investment costs. In order to ensure the competitive character of ProKilowatt,
the rules state that the total subsidy volume requested by all programmes and projects
should represent at least 120% of the available funds; otherwise, the available budget will
be reduced accordingly (i.e., otherwise eligible submissions are not funded). Programmes
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have dominated the ProKilowatt portfolio in comparison to projects (by a ratio of 2.5:1 from
2010 to 2016—ratios close to 4:1 were present for 2015 and 2016).
ProKilowatt was recently (March 2017 to June 2018) evaluated by the Swiss Federal
Audit Office (SFAO) —Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle, Contrôle Fédérale des Finances,
Controllo Federale delle Finanze, https://www.efk.admin.ch/de/ (accessed on 12 March
2021)—the supreme financial supervisory body of the Swiss Confederation [40]. SFAO’s
main point of criticism was that ProKilowatt does not correct for free-rider effects when
reporting their cost-effectiveness. In policy analysis, the free-rider effect refers to the
problem that some beneficiaries benefit from the policy measure, even though they would
have acted in the same way or very similarly in the absence of the policy measure. In
order to estimate the free-rider effects, SFAO conducted interviews. For projects, SFAO
interviewed EEP operators and estimated the free-rider effect at 25–30% ([40], p. 20).
For programmes, surveys organised by SFAO among participants indicated free-rider
effects of around 50%; surveys among EEP operators indicated only approximately 25%
(which SFAO rightly considers to be biased towards overly low values). In conclusion,
SFAO considers the true energy savings (after consideration of free-rider effect) of the
totality of all programmes and projects to be at least 25% lower than those reported by
ProKilowatt. By separating EEP administration costs from financial incentives, SFAO
consequently estimated the corrected cost effectiveness (Levelised Programme Cost, LPC)
at 3.6 CH cents/kWh electricity saved instead of 2.7 CH cents/kWh saved, as reported
by ProKilowatt (33% higher). Based on the analysis of case studies, SFAO argues that
the electricity savings reported by ProKilowatt may be overestimated by also assuming
overly long remaining lifetimes of incumbent technologies, disregarding the autonomous
technological progress and by instead assuming an overly simplified reference scenario
(current ProKilowatt rules aim to avoid overestimation by considering only 75% of the
electricity savings established as the difference between the old and new technology). SFAO
does not quantify the resulting error in ProKilowatt’s electricity savings, but argues that
empirically derived reference values should be developed in future for key technologies.
These should be based on sample measurements, and they should account for autonomous
technological progress in order to better assess whether the condition of additionality
is met.
As part of the cost analysis, SFAO also estimated the levelised total cost of saved
energy, thereby assuming an interest/discount rate of 5% p.a. They established values of
17 CH cents per saved kWh for the indicator LTCsimple (based on total costs) and 12 CH
cents/kWh for the indicator LTCreference (based on total costs minus costs of standard device;
see Table 1; both values exclude subsidies; the former is based on 348 projects and the latter
is based on case studies). In view of SFAO’s arguments regarding the overestimation of
electricity savings by ProKilowatt (as mentioned above: overly long remaining lifetimes,
neglect of autonomous technological progress and overly simplified reference scenarios),
these LTC values may be considered as underestimated. On the other hand, they do not
consider spillover effects (see also below).
SFAO estimated that ProKilowatt can contribute 15% (140 kWh per capita and per
year after correction for free-rider effects) of the 2035 energy savings target according to
the Swiss Energy Strategy (950 kWh/cap/year) and that the contribution of ProKilowatt is
hence significant (while being far from sufficient in view of need for other policy measures
to realize the remaining 85%). It can be concluded that SFAO overall considers ProKilowatt
to be well designed and basically expedient.
3.1.2. EEP in the Canton of Geneva
While, as mentioned above, there are very few EEPs at the cantonal level, the particular
context in Geneva has resulted in a similar scheme of EEOs as in the EU: since the utility
company serving the canton of Geneva belongs to the canton and the municipalities,
the local cantonal government was in a position to request the utility company to save
150 GWh p.a. of electricity by the end of 2013 (150 GWh—in actual fact achieved over
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the course of 2017— is equivalent to 5% of the original electricity demand) [41,42]. This
type of agreement was relatively easy to settle because the Swiss energy sector is so far
only partly liberalised (for large energy consumers) and because, unlike to other cantons,
only one utility serves this canton. Contrary to EEOs in the EU, the operation of the
EEPs (called éco21) in Geneva is not warranted for the longer-term because of insecure
financing. Guaranteed financing would require a national approach with involvement
of the regulatory authority for the electricity sector (i.e., ElCom in Switzerland), thereby
providing a legal basis for financing EEPs by means of a levy paid by utility customers (the
cost recovery mechanism is therefore sometimes described as ratepayer-funded). Operating
EEPs costs money, even if the programmes are cost-effective (this means that they save
more money than they cost). The reason why EEPs cost money is that investment costs
for energy efficient technologies are higher than for conventional technologies—calling
for subsidies—, and informing energy users about the opportunities and managing the
subsidies both imply expenditures —so-called programme costs). Since the Swiss Energy
Strategy 2050 foresees a gradual transition from a subsidy-based system to market-based
instruments ([43], p. 5), there has so far not been enough support for a national approach
in this direction.
In the past decade, electricity demand in the canton of Geneva levelled off and
started to decrease. A part of this decrease was related to the EEP éco21. Using bottom-up
approaches (deemed savings, treatment method, etc.) the electricity savings were estimated
at 175 GWh in 2018 (as of 2008), which is equivalent to 6.2% of the canton’s total electricity
demand in 2018 according to Cabrera et al. [44]. This value of 175 GWh represents the
effect of all energy efficiency measures implemented in 2018 and in earlier years as long as
these are still effective in 2018. The total does not include future energy savings caused by
the measures which have already been implemented.
To our knowledge, cost-effectiveness data on utility-operated EEPs in Switzerland are
publicly available only for Geneva. The levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC)
amounts to around 4 CH cents/kWh (see below Table 2). For the levelised total cost of
saved energy (LTC), data for individual sub-programmes run in Geneva were published
by Yushchenko and Patel [45]. For the entire Genevan EEP portfolio, values representing
the indicator LTCsimple (see Table 1) are displayed in Figure 2 (see bars), which shows
fluctuating values in the range of 13.5 and approximately 20 CH cents/kWh of electricity
(even 27 CH cents/kWh in the first year); in the last two years, LTCsimple amounted to
nearly 16 CH cents/kWh (chosen value for Table 2; see below).




Figure 2. EEP in the Swiss canton of Geneva (éco21, electricity savings only): Energy savings and 
expenditure on energy efficiency measures and program administration in total and per unit of 
energy saved (results of updated analysis formerly published by Yushchenko et al., 2017 [45] and 
Freyre, 2019 [46]) (1 CHF = 1.01 USD = 0.899 EUR in 2019; OFX, 2020). 
 
Figure 2. EEP in the Swiss canton of Geneva (éco21, electricity savings only): Energy savings and
expenditure on energy efficiency measures and program administration in total and per unit of
energy saved (results of updated analysis formerly published by Yushchenko et al., 2017 [45] and
Freyre, 2019 [46]) (1 CHF = 1.01 USD = 0.899 EUR in 2019; OFX, 2020).
Energies 2021, 14, 1742 8 of 28
Table 2. A summary of the cost-effectiveness data from programmes in U.S.A., the EU and Switzerland (values for Switzerland concern electricity saving programmes only, while fuel
savings are included in the values reported for the other countries).












Resid./Comm./Ind. Local (Geneva) 2015 CH cents/kWh 4 * 16 (LTCsimple) ** updated calculations
USA Residential National 2015 US cents/kWh 3.3 n/a [47]
Residential 38 frontrunner states 2015 US cents/kWh 4.3 n/a [47]
Comm./Ind. National 2015 US cents/kWh 2.2 n/a [47]
EU-Italy All (esp. Industry & Bldgs) National 2017 EUR cents/kWh 1.1 n/a [48]
EU-Denmark Ind./Resid./Services National n/a EUR cents/kWh ~1.0 2.9 based on [49]
Exchanges rate: 1 EUR = 1.12 USD in 2019 [39]; 1 DKK (Danish crown) = 0.134 EUR = 0.150 USD in 2019 [39]; 1 CHF = 1.01 USD = 0.899 EUR in 2019 [39]. * For electricity-saving programmes only (as is the case
for ProKilowatt); the respective value including fuel savings amounts to 3 CH cents/kWh. ** For electricity-saving programmes only (as is the case for ProKilowatt); the respective value including fuel savings
amounts to 12 CH cents/kWh.
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3.2. U.S.A.
In the U.S., utilities and a small number of non-utility parties have been operating
EEPs since the energy crisis in the 1970s, making it the country with arguably the longest
experience with this policy measure ([34,50,51]. As in most other countries, the costs
incurred by running EEPs are generally covered by a slight surcharge paid by utility
customers [51,52]. Since the additional cost imposed on utility customers needs to be
justified, EEPs have been evaluated on an annual basis ever since their existence in the U.S.
These evaluations include the assessment of the programme’s cost-effectiveness by
means of the concept of levelized programme cost of saved energy (LPC; see Table 1). As
shown by Cho et al. [47], the average LPC of EEPs in the residential sector at the national
level was 3.3 U.S. cents/kWh in 2015, while the respective value for 38 frontrunners with
more ambitious EEPs amounted to 4.3 U.S. cents/kWh. For the commercial and industrial
sectors, the U.S. average (savings-weighted) LPC equalled 2.2 U.S. cents/kWh in 2015 [47].
These values are low compared to the cost of electricity supply and the wholesale market
price (see also Section 3.4). In contrast, the values of the indicator LTC (levelized total cost
of saved energy) can clearly exceed those of the wholesale market price of energy and LPC
(see below, Section 3.4).
In spite of the continuous existence of EEPs for nearly 50 years in the U.S., the cost-
effectiveness analyses indicate that there is no shortage of economically attractive EE
offerings. While the conditions in the U.S. differ from other countries, it is nevertheless
plausible that innovation and changes on the demand side (e.g., new products, higher
diffusion and increased comfort) have resulted in a continuous flow of EEMs which are at
the threshold of cost-effectiveness and which therefore lend themselves to support by EEPs.
Given the large unexploited technical potential, it seems reasonable to assume that this will
continue to be the case at least for the medium term, and given the broad comparability
of energy technology applied across the globe (e.g., for household appliances, industrial
equipment and building technology), this finding is very likely to be transferrable to other
countries too.
In approximately half of U.S. states, utilities are obligated to offer energy efficiency
programmes [47], and most of them have introduced binding energy efficiency targets
known in the United States as energy efficiency resource standards, or EERS [53]. In U.S.
states with EEPs, per-capita expenditure on EEPs increased from around 5 USD/cap in
2006 to 20 USD/cap in 2015, with the highest spending levels being close to or beyond
80 USD/cap in 2015 (in Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Vermont) [47].
While the introduction and expansion of EEPs in the U.S. can be considered a success
story, it is important to note that these EEPs were typically not implemented by the utilities
as a voluntary act. Instead, it was a prerequisite that a suitable regulatory framework was
in place which obligated the utilities directly or indirectly to implement EEMs [51].
3.3. EU
This concept of obligating the utilities is a special form of EEP which, in Europe,
is referred to as an energy efficiency obligation (EEO) scheme (this expression is more
commonly used in the EU than in the U.S.). In the 1990s and early 2000s, four countries
(Denmark, France, Great Britain and Italy) followed the U.S. by implementing EEO schemes.
While the U.S. schemes had been (and still are) operated in highly regulated markets,
their implementations in Great Britain and France and later on in Italy and Denmark
demonstrated their applicability in liberalised markets [54,55].
The EEOs were then encouraged in the EU Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC; [56])
and more strongly in the EU Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU), which includes
as one of its key elements, Article 7 on the implementation of national energy efficiency
obligation (EEO) schemes [57]. It establishes that Member States shall establish an EEOS
and/or make use of alternative measures, to achieve a minimum amount of energy savings
over a given obligation period. For the period 2014 until 2020, the minimum EE target was
set in terms of new annual energy savings equivalent to 1.5% of the annual sales of energy
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to the final customers. In practice, a range of options was made possible for Member States
to reduce their targets down in most cases to about 0.75%/year. The 2018 amendment to the
Energy Efficiency Directive [7] sets the minimum end-use energy savings to at least 0.8%
of final energy consumption for the period 2021 to 2030, to be reached by EEO schemes,
alternative policy measures or both. In principle, the savings objective for EEOs applies
to all types of energy carriers transformed, distributed and transmitted; this concerns
primarily electricity and gas, but likewise district heating and cooling, heating oil, fuels
for transport and sometimes biomass (e.g., in Austria). When implementing an EEOS,
Member States are entitled not to impose EEOs on small utilities in order to avoid an
unreasonable administrative burden. In 2020, EEOs were implemented in 16 countries
that altogether represent 58% of the total final energy demand of EU28 [58]. Four Member
States relied fully on their EEOS to meet their target for the Article 7 EED. Twelve Member
States combined an EEO scheme with alternative EEMs; and the remainder (12 Member
States) exclusively chose alternative EEMs. For the forerunners Great Britain, France, Italy
and Denmark, and for Austria—and for comparison, also for Vermont and California—
Rosenow and Bayer [28] published in 2016 performance indicators of the respective EEO
schemes, a summary of which is given in Appendix A. For the reporting periods covered
(all falling into the timespan from 2006 to 2015), the weighted cost of the EEO schemes in
the five EU countries amounted to 0.4 to 1.1 EUR cents (1 EUR = 1.112 CHF = 1.123 USD
(0.899 EUR = 1 CHF = 1.01 USD in 2019 [39]) per kWh. That cost, which can be considered
as a levelised programme cost (LPC) of saved energy for the entire EEO scheme, is rather
low, also compared to the U.S. It should, however, be considered that, depending on the
practical rules of the schemes (e.g., eligibility of action types, baselines used to calculate
the energy savings), the saving rates can correspond to different ambition levels and may
be characterised by different levels of additionality or free-riders. In practice, there are a
number of other reasons why the performance indicators across countries are not directly
comparable [59], with the available data not allowing one to assess the key indicators in a
harmonised way.
While information on the effectiveness of EEOs in more recent years is still scarce and
scattered, we compiled the latest available data for Denmark and Italy which are explained
in some detail in Appendices B and C.
3.4. Summary
Table 2 shows the levelised cost of EEP in Switzerland from the perspective of the
respective values for the U.S., Italy and Denmark. The values should not be directly
compared due to the somewhat different ways of quantifying energy savings (e.g., due
to different definitions of the reference trajectory), different ambition levels (e.g., across
leaders and laggards among the EEPs in the U.S.), different policy scopes (e.g., the values
for Switzerland refer to electricity savings, while the values for the other countries include
fuel savings) and other reasons [59]. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the values for
LPC range between approximately 1 and 4 (U.S. or CH) cents per kWh electricity saved.
LPC values are generally lower than the wholesale price of electricity (5 CH cents per kWh;
this value was assumed by the Swiss Confederation, Revision of Energy Act (2020) [60] as
well; 1 U.S. cent and 1 CH cent are roughly equal). This is one important reason why EEPs
have become a strategic component of so-called integrated resource planning (“integrated
resource planning” is a technical term which is commonly used in the U.S. to describe the
process leading to a long-term utility plan for matching the energy demand projected for
a given area by both supply-side resources and demand-side resources, with the latter
consisting of energy efficiency and load management [9,61]). It also explains why energy
efficiency is referred to as “low-cost, low risk resource” in the U.S. [62] and why the
“energy-efficiency-first principle” is pursued in the EU [6,63]. However, it must be kept in
mind that the indicator LPC only represents the leverage effect of an EEP, i.e., the ratio of
the programme cost to the energy savings (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
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Less data are available for LTC, but the accessible sources for Switzerland indicate
a range of values between 12 and 17 CH cents per kWh electricity saved. Values for the
indicator LTC are hence larger than for LPC by a factor 3 to 4, and they clearly exceed the
wholesale price of electricity.
4. Discussion
Based on insights from the literature and from practical experience, we compiled the
main strengths of EEPs and their main drawbacks, which are summarised in Table 3 and
described in more detail in Appendix D.
Table 3. Overview of the strengths and drawbacks of EEPs.
Strengths Drawbacks
Cost-effectiveness
- EEPs allow one to save energy at lower cost than producing it.
- This statement refers to Levelised Programme Cost of Saved
Energy (LPC), and not to Levelised Total Cost of saved energy
(LTC).
Free-rider effect
- Is possibly the most widely quoted drawback of EEPs
Reducing upfront cost
- Subsidies, rebates etc. help to overcome barrier of higher
investment costs of EE technologies).
Continuous adaption to markets and legislation
- Careful tracking of market and product trends and
continuous EEP adaptation required to ensure
effectiveness
Attracting attention and creating awareness
- EEPs attract attention of households and companies.
- Higher awareness contributes to accelerated market uptake.
- EEPs ensure a minimum market volume, thereby
incentivizing market actors to develop new business models
and offers.
Possible lack of visibility for market actors
- Many EEPs are long-lasting, but some have been
terminated (e.g., Danish EEOS at end of 2020). More
generally, targets and rules might change significantly
over time, creating uncertainty for market actors.
Metering energy efficiency is challenging
- Quantifying the energy efficiency gains is more
demanding than metering renewable energy.
Providing guidance to energy users
- Multitude and heterogeneity of EE technologies is confusing
for consumers.
- Information provided by impartial body facilitates decision
making.
Conflict of interest for utilities
- For EEPs and EEOs operated by utilities in largely
liberalised energy markets (can be addressed by
decoupling policies)
Enhanced market diffusion and market transformation
- EEPs can catalyze market diffusion and market
transformation.
- Familiarisation with new EE technology within EEP may
enhance implementation elsewhere (spillover effect).
Risk of fraud
- Presence of large budgets entails risk of fraud
- The large number of actions supported can make it
difficult to control their quality or compliance.
Low indirect environmental and health impacts
- In general, less environmental and health impacts than
conventional technologies and renewables.
Fuel poverty
- EEP may exacerbate fuel poverty when their costs are
recovered through the energy prices (as for most
EEOs), unless special attention is paid to low-income
households.




- Applicable at smaller scale, e.g., at the level of provinces or
cantons
Upfront cost to set up the scheme
- -EEPs often require significant efforts to establish (e.g.,
for the monitoring & verification system), which are
only worthwhile if the scheme is meant to be
long-lasting.
High level of acceptance
- Valid especially for EEPs implying subsidies, rebates etc.; less
so for EEOs.
Combinability with tradable White Certificates (WhC)
- Combination of EEPs with WhC can be effective.
Focus on short-term effectiveness
- Some EEPs (WhC in particular) might trigger the
easiest actions, but possibly creating lock-in effects
(e.g., partial insulation instead of deep retrofit).
Economies of scale
- E.g. lower price by large-volume purchases of energy-efficient
appliances
Green growth and positive employment effects
- Positive impacts on GDP and employment to be expected
Link to sufficiency strategies
- Inclusion of sufficiency in EEPs as future development option
In the following, we discuss the factors which are most decisive for the overall assess-
ment of EEPs.
The free-rider effect and the high administrative burden discussed above are accom-
panied by a number of disadvantages, but arguably the most important ones are their
negative impacts on the policy measure’s effectiveness and its cost-effectiveness. Therefore,
if in spite of the presence of free-rider effects and the cost of programme administration,
the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of an EEP are sufficiently high, there would be
strong arguments in favour of its implementation. The question is, therefore, whether that
is the case. One way of answering this question is to compare quantitative information on
the cost-effectiveness, while another is to discuss the effectiveness in a conceptual manner.
In the following, we subsequently apply both lines of argumentation (a and b).
(a) As presented above, the percentage of the free-rider effect found in the literature
varies widely. Generally speaking, it seems unlikely that an EEP with a free-rider effect
clearly beyond 50% is economically viable (see also below). EEP operators should ensure
minimal free-rider effects, presumably below or well below 50%. Possible reasons for
accepting a certain level of free-rider effects and the related additional costs may be the
willingness to support (i) protagonists who help promoting the energy transition, (ii)
companies as a somewhat hidden form of innovation support (unless conflicting with
other regulations) or (iii) low-income households as a contribution to social policy. To be
more specific, cost-effectiveness data need to be compared. As explained in Section 2, this
can be done using the indicators levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC) and
levelised total cost of saved energy (LTC). We argue that the former—representing the
utility’s perspective—is an overly partial view. The latter, LTC, is closer to the cost of society
(without, however, considering indirect effects) and is therefore our indicator of choice. As
the basis for our discussion based on LTC, we revert to the Swiss EEP schemes. According
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to Table 2 in Section 3, the LTC values amount to approximately 15 CH cents/kWh saved
(in more detail, ranging from 12 to 17 CH cents/kWh depending on the source and the
indicator choice). These values can be compared to the levelised cost of energy supply,
and in particular, that of renewable energy supply (to ensure coherence with the Swiss
Energy Strategy 2050). We hereby follow the approach chosen by SFAO which compiled in
their study the levelised cost of energy supply shown in Table 4. This comparison indicates
that LTC values of EEP are typically lower compared to the levelised cost of renewable
energy supply in Switzerland with the exception of large hydropower, for which the low
end of cost of 5–6 (2–10) CH cents/kWh represents generation in partially amortised plants.
Future costs of new plants are reported to gradually rise to higher values. According to
Bauer et al. [64], a total of 1.6 TWh/a can be generated at a cost below 15 CH cents/kWh
(this value excludes consideration of the requirements related to the Water Protection Act).
In addition, large to very large photovoltaic plants (≥100 kWpeak and ≥1000 kWpeak (see
Table 4) allow one to generate electricity at lower cost than EEPs. Here, the comparison
is complicated by the fact that intermittent renewable energy supply technologies do not
supply electricity all the time, whereas EE technologies reduce the electricity demand when
they are operated, and many contribute to a reduction of peak load. A fair analysis would
consider the temporal patterns and would need to consider back-up or energy storage
technologies for intermittent renewable energy supply [65] and renewables, which are
not always available (e.g., small hydropower), hence resulting in higher supply cost. This
would make EEPs more competitive than the lowest values for PVs indicate. Overall, it
can be concluded that the cost of EEPs is generally well within the cost ranges that can be
expected for renewable energy in Switzerland. We herewith draw a different conclusion
than SFAO, which considers the differences in cost effectiveness between EE and renewable
energy to be substantial and therefore argues in favour of more flexibility in funding
between these two domains [40]. However, if the reported levelised cost values for EEPs
are underestimated as a consequence of underestimated free-rider effects, this would
clearly reduce the attractiveness of EEPs.
Table 4. Levelised cost of renewable electricity supply in Switzerland [64].
Renewable Electricity Source Levelized CostCH cents/kWh Comment
Large hydropower 7–30
includes partially amortized plants for which a range of
5–6
(2–10) CH cents/kWh is reported
Small hydropower 12–28 excluding electr. generation in existing drinking waterpipes for which higher values are reported
Wind power in CH 15–20 -
PV 6 kWpeak 26 -
10 kWpeak 23 -
30 kWpeak 18 -
100 kWpeak 12 -
1000 kWpeak 10 -
Biomass (combustion of wood) 18–36 -
Industrial and agricultural biogas 20–49 -
(b) We now proceed to the conceptual, qualitative discussion on the cost-effectiveness.
Many authors consider EEPs to be less effective and less cost-effective than alternative
policy measures such as taxes [66]. At the same time, there is widespread consensus about
the inelasticity of energy demand. By analogy, stricter regulations for existing buildings
(e.g., stricter building codes) may be more effective than EEPs. However, as for carbon
taxes, the limited acceptability by private consumers and companies also poses limits on
strongly tightened building codes. Against this background, Labandeira and Linares [67]
concluded that carbon pricing at the level needed to compensate the externalities is not
feasible, thereby calling for “second-best” instruments. In combination with the multiple
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objectives pursued by energy policy (e.g., different sectors, different product lifetimes,
different decision making criteria etc.), this explains why there is wide agreement that a
combination of several policy measures is needed (see, e.g., [68]). In such a portfolio, EEPs
could be included because they enjoy a high level of acceptance and they help to overcome
specific barriers (e.g., awareness/information, technology choice and high upfront cost).
In the literature and as evidenced by the considerations above, major attention is
being paid to the free-rider effect, whereas this is by far not the case for its counterpart,
the spillover effect. In the context of the present article, the spillover effect represents the
indirect promotion of EE technologies as a consequence of an EEP, e.g., by installation
companies which start offering it (supply side) or by customers who request it (demand
side; for example, in some locations, e.g., Zurich, public buildings such as schools, hospitals
and municipal buildings have been preferentially constructed according to the low-energy
building code “Minergie”). The spillover effect is an essential and highly desired mech-
anism in the market transformation towards clearly more energy efficient products and
services. It should therefore actually be considered on equal footing with free-rider effects.
A possible reason for the lower level of attention paid to the spillover effect is that it may
be even more challenging to quantify. This may be partly related to the fact that spillovers
imply longer market transformation processes, with numerous other influencing factors
playing roles (e.g., R&D and innovation policy, pre-existing knowledge base, etc.), whereas
free-riding reduces the cost-effectiveness immediately.
The line between free-riding and effective promotion is thin, indicating how challeng-
ing diligent programme operation is: An EEP should incentivize the market transformation
at adequate cost (see below), but it should avoid subsidising a transformation process that
would occur autonomously, since this would simply result in more free-riders and lower
cost-effectiveness. On the other hand, it is often not clear at early stages of market diffusion
and even in more advanced stages of the market transformation process whether any
dominating autonomous trend is present. Moreover, the cost-effectiveness may strongly
depend on the local circumstances. For example, while in general, LED lighting can be
considered cost-effective today, this may not be the case in high halls requiring a movable
scaffold for replacement; economic viability may also depend on whether only the light
source (lamp) can be exchanged or whether the luminaire needs to be replaced too. It is
at the programme operator’s discretion to make this type of decision. It also needs to be
considered that incumbent technologies which have been prohibited in the past years or
which have been outpaced by new technologies in economic terms may remain in use for
long periods of time if no dedicated policy is implemented.
Programme operators and/or policy makers will also have to decide about the ambi-
tion level which influences the cost-effectiveness:
(i) If the focus is on lowest possible cost (as is the case for competitive tendering under
the ProKilowatt programme), only so-called “low-hanging fruit” is picked (the most
opportunistic approach); this programme design may come along with a relatively
high level of free-riding.
(ii) EEPs may have highest effect for technologies with medium cost-effectiveness where
the more ample use of these technologies as a consequence of the EEPs can help to
bring down the investment costs.
(iii) EEPs for measures with very high investment costs and typically long payback times
can rapidly become very expensive. It is possible that such measures will nevertheless
need to be implemented in order to reach ambitious energy and climate goals (as
defined in CH and the EU). In this case, implementation may have to be limited
to certain buildings or sectors (e.g., private sector). The combination with other
policy measures (e.g., a large green fund) may be another possibility in order to
realize deeper energy efficiency improvements than have so far been achieved with
known EEPs.
These considerations are actually not only relevant for EEPs, but rather for EE
technologies in general; they nevertheless complicate the assessment of EEPs, since the
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cost-effectiveness of EEPs will differ partly as a function of the ambition level; this can
then lead to apparently conflicting findings which may ultimately act as a barrier to
EEP implementation.
EEPs may also differ in terms of temporal scope and continuity. For example, projects
and programmes implemented in the context of ProKilowatt are funded for a maximum
operating period of three years and their spatial coverage is subject to the programme
operator’s choices. In contrast, the oldest parts of the EEP “éco21” have been operated in
the canton of Geneva since 2009 and can be expected to have allowed Geneva to achieve
higher levels of market transition (albeit possibly at higher cost).
The funding level (which is linked to the ambition level and the free-rider effect) is
also a matter of available funds. Ratepayers ultimately finance the programme, and the
size of the budget is a political decision which may be made at the national level (e.g., up
to 0.1 CH cent/kWh in Switzerland for the ProKilowatt programme according to the Swiss
Energy Law [69]) or at the local level (e.g., 0.6 CH cents/kWh up to 1.0 CH cent in the
Swiss canton of Vaud and in a number of cities, e.g., Lausanne), albeit with differences in
legal certainty.
As mentioned above, EEPs offer, apart from energy savings, a number of environmen-
tal, health-related and social co-benefits, also termed “multiple benefits.” Examples are
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission abatement, reduction of local air pollution, alleviation
of energy poverty, innovation, competitiveness and productivity and energy security and
macroeconomic benefits (employment and GDP; see above). Since these are challenging
to quantify (some methods are being developed; see, e.g., [70]) they are most frequently
discussed in qualitative terms or discussed individually (e.g., [28,29]). Instead, they could
be expressed in terms of avoided external costs, which would require an agreement about
the method to apply (compare [71–73]) and about the assumptions underlying the reference
development without EEP.
It is also important to note that EEPs are not necessarily easily accepted within the
implementing utility. For decades the mindset of utilities has been dominated by a culture
of growth and expansion, which is common to our economy and society as a whole. From
the perspective of the utility, an EEP can be seen as a business model of de-growth, which
can induce cultural clashes and incoherent strategies within utilities (compare, e.g., [52]).
The acceptance of EEPs partly depends on the credibility of the programme operators,
the complexity of the programmes and the effort to be made by participants. Some com-
petition may be helpful while too many actors and programmes create confusion among
potential participants and can be counter-productive, hence calling for some governance
about the distribution of tasks and of the roles of the various stakeholders.
This also indicates that implementing an EEP raises questions of multi-level gover-
nance, e.g., about the roles of the grid operator, the energy suppliers and the authorities
which depend, inter alia, on the level of (de)regulation, the utility structure and their scale
and the reputation of the actors.
5. Conclusions
In the U.S., utilities have been implementing EEPs for more than four decades, whereas
the experience with utility-operated EEPs in Europe is mostly limited to one or two decades.
Nevertheless, valuable insights can be gained from countries which have implemented this
policy instrument rather recently.
Like all other policy measures, EEPs have advantages and disadvantages. An impor-
tant argument in favour of EEPs is that they are characterised by high cost effectiveness,
with the cost of saving energy use being cheaper than its supply. However, this partly
depends on the chosen metric and the country context. For Switzerland, the finding was
confirmed for the metric levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC), whereas the
available values for the indicator levelised total cost of saved energy (LTC) indicate a com-
parable cost level for saving energy as for generating renewable energy. In case the reported
levelised cost values for EEPs are underestimated as a consequence of underestimated
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free-rider effects (see also below) the attractiveness of EEPs would be lower. EEPs can be
effective and cost-effective even many decades after their introduction (e.g., in the U.S.)
and even in the case of a high ambition level (e.g., in Denmark) but that calls for very good
management and cost awareness. So far, EEPs have been implemented with the objective
of leveraging low-cost energy efficiency potentials while more expensive measures (e.g.,
deep retrofitting of building envelope) have to date been addressed by other policies (build-
ing standards; subsidies—in Switzerland, the Building Programme—Gebäudeprogramm,
Programme Bâtiment—is financed from the CO2 levy and hence follows the same approach
as an EEP.; in other countries this type of subsidies are financed from other sources —e.g.,
general tax revenue).
EEPs can help to overcome the investment barrier of high upfront cost. They also
help to inform key stakeholders about key EE technologies, which can facilitate accelerated
market uptake and spillover benefits. Some further strengths of EEPs include, inter alia,
the co-benefits triggered by improved energy efficiency (see, e.g., [70]), the possibility of
implementation at small scale and economies of scale when expanding the EEP. Possibly
the most serious drawback is the free-rider effect (which typically increases the costs and
deteriorates the cost effectiveness). Further challenges are the very high level of diligence
needed in programme operation, the demanding nature of quantifying energy efficiency
gains (e.g., compared to monitoring of renewable energy production) and the conflict
of interest in the case of EEPs operated by utilities in largely liberalised energy markets
without adequate legal framework.
Key conclusions are:
• Not unexpectedly, EEPs cannot serve as “silver bullets”; i.e., they should be seen as
part of a portfolio of policy measures (see, e.g., [74,75]).
• At the same time, EEPs do allow one to address market failures, which are not or are
hardly targeted by other policy instruments, particularly lack of information, lack
of understanding and inelastic energy demand. EEPs help to accelerate the market
uptake of energy efficient products and to renew the stock containing inefficient
products and they incentivize the adoption of more energy-efficient practices without
increasing taxes or the public dept.
• An EEP is a policy measure that enjoys a high level of acceptance. For these reasons it
can, in principle, be recommended as element of an effective energy policy portfolio.
• When taking advantage of the fact that EEPs can be implemented at variable scales, it is
recommended to gradually expand the activities, either as centralised policy (centred
around a green national fund) or as decentralised activities with separate funding
and management structures, while still collaborating (e.g., exchange of protocols, joint
procurement) in order to speed up the learning, to make use of economies of scale and
to reach more ambitious policy goals.
• In any case, an adequate legal setting is required for EEPs to successfully operate.
EEP forms endowed with higher levels of empowerment are generally more effective.
This implies mandatory energy efficiency savings targets (as realised for EEOs) in
combination with programme cost recovery and possibly earnings opportunities tied
to performance toward savings targets. As a further requirement, especially for large
EEPs, the organisation acting as project operator must be trusted for its expertise and
must be reputed for its integrity.
To conclude, EEPs programmes are very likely to be needed for the time being, at least
as long as (i) EE and climate objectives have not been reached, (ii) barriers to EE continue
to persist and (iii) the overall level of acceptance of EEPs is high. They should, however, be
designed to be consistent with other policy instruments, and ideally, to operate in synergy
with them. While traditionally EEPs have been implemented to “pick the low-hanging
fruit,” urgent energy and climate policy goals call for a deeper understanding whether and
to what extent this policy instrument can be further developed in order to exploit more
costly EE potentials and thereby bring about more significant change.
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Future research could also elaborate criteria and indicators (e.g., building on projects
such as Odyssee-MURE [76], ENSPOL [34,38] and EPATEE [77]), allowing one to establish
whether or not the conditions for successful EEPs are met in a given country, province or
canton. It should also be better understood how much emphasis to put on EEPs in a policy
mix, which (sub)sectors and applications should develop EEPs and whether national (or
even European) reference technology should be developed for expected energy savings
(deemed savings) and the related costs, with the objective of both promoting EEPs and
bringing down the cost of EE technologies. Further research could deal with strategies
for minimising the free-rider effects and maximising the spillover dynamics, and with
methods for monitoring, further optimising the operation of EEPs and the inclusion of
sufficiency strategies in EEPs.
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Appendix A Performance Indicators of Energy Efficiency Obligation (EEO) Schemes
The data below originate from Rosenow and Bayer (2016) [28].





















France 2011–2014 6 0.4 # 0.4%
All sectors except for
facilities subject to ETS
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transport fuels)





















Italy 2006–2014 12 0.7 0.4% All sectors EnergyDistributors
Austria 2015 11 0.5 0.9%
All sectors but mandatory
minimum share for
residential sector (40%)





California 2010–2012 19 2.1 * 1.0% Residential, commercial,industrial, agricultural
# combinable with tax rebate scheme; * preliminary; ** for 2009–2011
Appendix B EEO Scheme in Italy
Italy introduced an EEO system which takes the form of a White Certificates (WhC)
scheme requiring electricity and gas distributors with more than 50,000 customers to
implement energy efficiency measures [77,78]. Introduced in 2004 and confirmed by the
National Energy Strategy 2017 [79], it makes the energy savings available as tradable good,
thereby increasing the instrument’s flexibility. Nearly 60% of the savings are related to
natural gas use (“tipo II”), and approximately 20% each concern electricity use (“tipo I”) and
other types of fuels (“tipo III”) [80]. The savings are primarily realised in the industry sector
(58%), followed by the built environment (38%; [80], Table 3.2). The energy efficiency target
related to White Certificates amounted to 4.3 Mtoe of final energy per year in 2020 (from
actions over 2014–2020) or 16.0 Mtoe cumulated over 2014–2020 (it is not straightforward
to follow the evolution of savings in the various publications addressing it, with the main
reasons being different time periods, different reference trajectories, deviations from the
target in some years, usage of a correction factor—tau factor, introduced in 2011 and
elimination some years later—and differences between certified savings and generated
savings) (NEEAP 2014, quoted in [78]). This is equivalent to 60% p.a. of the national
energy efficiency target under Article 7 of the EED [57,78]. The actual contribution of White
Certificates to the overall energy efficiency target amounted to approximately 40% in the
2014–2020 period [81].
The value of the White Certificates varied from around 50 to 100 EUR (1 EUR = 1.12 USD
in 2019 [39]) per tonne of oil equivalent (toe) in the period 2006 to 2015 to around
300 EUR/toe in recent years as a consequence of stricter targets (ENEA, 2019, p.49; EPATEE
Italy; in 2017–2018 up to 480 EUR/toe due to fraud issues; Broc et al., 2020). For the period
2004 to 2017, the average value of a White Certificate amounted to 2.9 EUR cents per kWh
of saved energy. According to Iorio and Federici ([48], Table 4) the total value for 13 years
amounts to (12 + 7 GigaEUR)/57.3 Mtoe = 2.9 EUR cents/kWh, with 12 GigaEUR—or
1.8 EUR cents/kWh—representing the companies’ annual expenses related to the energy
efficiency measures, while public spending for the EEP (White Certificate scheme) ac-
counted for the remainder. Of this total, 1.8 EUR cents/kWh were related to the expenses
of the companies implementing the measure, while the remaining 1.1 EUR cents/kWh (for
comparison: at most 1.7 EUR cents/kWh in the period 2005–2011 according to [78], p. 5)
were related to public spending for the White Certificate scheme, hence representing the
levelised programme cost of saved energy (LPC; [48]).
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Appendix C EEO Scheme in Denmark
Together with the UK, Denmark was the first EU country to establish an EEO scheme
some 20 years ago ([82], p. 4), and the country is considered a leader in its energy policy in
terms of approaches and ambition level (e.g., 70% GHG emission reduction from 1990 until
2030 and net zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest [83]. For energy efficiency, its original
energy target was around 3% p.a. [84], i.e., twice as high as required by Article 7 of the EU’s
Energy efficiency Directive [57]. Even if the target was corrected downwards in 2016 due to
the increasing cost (partly as a consequence of more stringent criteria for additionality and
due to a higher cost [85,86], p. 16), it still by far exceeds the requirements (between 2.6%
and 3.0% of the Danish final energy consumption between 2013 and 2020; [86], p. 10; [87]).
Reported cost-effectiveness data are based on first-year final energy savings and they
include weighting factors to represent the efficiency of energy conversion, to prioritize
measures with long as opposed to short lifetime and to ensure additionality ([87]; the
published values are hence not consistent with LPC as defined in Table 1). While levelised
programme costs of saved energy (LPC) were not reported, we estimated them at a value
in the order of 1 EUR cent/kWh. Division of total programme cost of around 121 million
EUR (905 million crowns) in 2018 for 2100 GWh of final energy savings [49] results in costs
of around 6 EUR cents per kWh of first-year savings. Assuming an average lifetime of
around 10 years (this is a conservative estimate based on [88], p. 6) and a discount rate of
2% (resulting in an annuity factor of 11.1%) leads to levelised programme cost of saved
energy (LPC according to Table 1) of 0.7 EUR cents/kWh. For comparison, Surmeli-Anac
et al. ([85], p. 15) reported a cost-effectiveness of 0.5 EUR cents/kWh saved. According
to the policy guide of bigEE [89], the levelised costs are in the range of 1 to 2 EUR cents
per kWh saved. Our estimated value in the order of 1 EUR cent/kWh represents the
total across all energy distributors (except for fuel oil distributors), i.e., utilities providing
electricity, natural gas and district heating (43%, 45% and 12% of the final energy savings,
respectively, with very similar individual cost-effectiveness; [49]). Savings are realised in
buildings (30% of energy savings in households and 20% in the private and public service
sectors) and industry (45%) ([85], p. 11). Programme costs increased by 22% from 2014
to 2016, but decreased again in 2017 and 2018, resulting in a more moderate increase by
12% from 2014 to 2018 ([49], Table 2). Additionality is ensured by excluding measures
already foreseen by other policies ([85], 2018). In evaluations, additionality is assessed by
surveying participants which are subject to large uncertainties due to biased answering [87]
and may indicate that the actual cost-effectiveness is lower than reported (see also [88],
p. 5). Next to the cost-effectiveness from the programme perspective, the socio-economic
net value of the energy savings (accounting for avoided externalities) was also estimated,
showing a high benefit (0.8 to 0.9 EUR cents per kWh saved [87]).
While the EEO scheme can be considered as highly successful and exemplary for other
countries, the Danish government has decided to replace it by a grant fund in combination
with an auctioning scheme as of 2021 (competitive subsidy scheme; [83], p. 100).
Appendix D Strengths and Drawbacks of Energy Efficiency Programmes (EEPs)
Appendix D.1 Strengths
Cost-effectiveness: A key argument that is repeatedly put forward in favour of EEPs
is that they allow one to save energy at less cost than to produce it. For example, Molina
(2014) [62] found that EEPs in the U.S. saved 1 kWh of energy at about half to one third
of the cost of generating 1 kWh of energy from different energy supply sources [62]. In
particular, EEP schemes that are characterised by a cost recovery mechanism and an EE
target (in the U.S. referred to as energy efficiency resource standards, EERS) and financial
performance incentives for EE are reported to achieve higher energy savings than EEPs
where these features are not or only partly present ([52]. Where EEPs lower costs, they
also lower risks, reduce emissions, promote local economic growth and employment and
increase electric system reliability and resilience [52]. Further benefits put forward are
the avoided energy-related and capacity-related costs, such as “avoided transmission
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and distribution (T&D) costs, peak demand benefits, price mitigation effects in wholesale
markets, and reduced pollution” [62]. These arguments are of particular importance in
the European context in view of the foreseen electrification of heating (heat pumps) and
transport (EVs).
It should, however, be noted that these arguments are primarily formulated from the
utility perspective and thereby typically refer to levelised programme costs of saved energy
(LPC; e.g., [24], p. 24). The data presented in Section 3 for the U.S., the EU and Switzerland
largely corroborate the findings for LPC. In contrast, as mentioned above, the levelised
total cost of saved energy (LTC; see Section 2) is by far higher than the wholesale market
price of energy.
Reducing upfront costs: It is widely known that EE technologies (just like renewable
energy technologies) are characterised by relatively high upfront costs (investment costs),
which represents an implementation barrier even if the levelised cost (i.e., the total cost of
ownership, including operation) is lower compared to the incumbent technology. EEPs
tackle this barrier, e.g., by providing subsidies to those customers purchasing EE technology.
In this way they also address to some extent the landlord–tenant dilemma.
Attracting attention and creating awareness: Supported by the media, subsidies and
the related EEPs attract the attention of households and companies. Given the fact that
EE technologies are typically not widely known, EEPs hence serve as important means of
communication to end users, installers and decision makers. By disseminating essential
information and raising awareness, they contribute to accelerated market uptake [90,91].
EEPs, and in particular EEOs, thereby follow the same mindset as developed by Michael
Porter, who argued that, “Properly designed environmental standards can trigger innova-
tion that may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them” [92].
Porter argued that companies pay limited attention to cleaner, more efficient technology
but that properly designed environmental regulation can incentivize them to develop
new, competitive solutions that can result in early-mover advantages compared to other
countries without comparable regulation.
Providing guidance to energy users: Today, there is no area of economic and human
activity without energy use. The heterogeneity of technologies is consequently vast and
is ever increasing, with the market power of producers and advertisements playing more
and more important roles. Consumers and decision makers are (increasingly) puzzled over
which option to choose (likewise for products that do not use energy [93,94]). In such a
context, guidance (communication) by an impartial and well-informed stakeholder is es-
sential. It can contribute to lower purchases of energy-wasting products (e.g., incandescent
and halogen lamps prior to their ban).
Enhanced market diffusion and market transformation: EEPs can catalyse market
diffusion and contribute to market transformation. For example, installation companies
which become familiar with novel technologies in the context of EEPs may well start offer-
ing or even giving preference to these options outside the scope of EEPs. This phenomenon,
termed the spillover effect, is the counterpart of the free-rider effect, and it is similarly
difficult to quantify in the context of EEP evaluations (interestingly, the phenomenon of
spillover is not at all addressed in SFAU’s evaluation discussed in Section 3.3).
Low indirect environmental and health impacts: The use of any technology causes
impacts, but the sizes of the impacts differ and may be larger or smaller compared to
incumbent technologies (traditional energy supply) and competing technologies (e.g.,
renewable energy technologies). For example, heat recovery implies the production and
installation of a heat exchanger (both cause impacts), but typically these impacts are
much lower than not having the EE technology (even when considering embodied or grey
energy); this also applies to other EE technologies, e.g., thermal insulation of buildings
or improved process control. EE technologies can be expected to cause, in general, less
indirect environmental and health impacts than most conventional [23,95] and many
renewable energy technologies (for example, compared to hydropower and biomass,
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with the attendant needing to build roads and change the landscape, e.g., resulting in
biodiversity impacts).
Local implementation: While certain policy measures such as CO2 taxation and
regulations of minimum energy performance for appliances or cars can only be introduced
at the national or supranational level, EEPs have the advantage that they can also be applied
at smaller scales, e.g., at the level of provinces or cantons [95]; for smaller geographical
areas preferably rather in collaboration with larger EEP operators).
High level of acceptance: Since most EEPs imply subsidies, rebates or their like,
and since policy measures of this type generally enjoy a high level of acceptance, this
can also be expected for EEPs. Obviously, lower levels of acceptance can be expected for
EEP and EEO versions which imply higher levels of commitment by the beneficiaries or
which are accompanied by rigid controls and sanctions. The generally high acceptance
of EEPs is a strength, even in comparison to some renewable energy policies which may
lack acceptance for a diversity of reasons (e.g., nature conservation, or the NIMBY effect
standing for “not-in-my-backyard”).
Combinability with tradable White Certificates: The combination of EEPs and EEOs
with tradable certificates, typically referred to as White Certificates—offering further
flexibility—can be effective [96], and they have been successfully implemented in some
countries. EEPs can also be combined with policy instruments from other domains. For
example, EEPs in the U.S. have successfully teamed up with policy measures in the social
housing domain, resulting in win–win solutions [47].
Economies of scale: Large EEPs can leverage economies of scale, e.g., when purchas-
ing appliances in large numbers (e.g., energy efficient lighting or control equipment), which
is an advantage that can be exploited once having proven the operability and the desired
effects of smaller programmes (e.g., [45,97]).
Green growth and positive employment effects: While there are only very few
macro-economic analyses of EEPs (e.g., [98–100]), positive impacts on GDP and employ-
ment can be expected. First, it is plausible that programmes that are economically vi-
able from a private perspective, and make use of goods and services which are sourced
domestically, result in benefits compared to, for example, systems that rely on fuel—
which is imported by most countries. Second, there is substantial body of research on
the macro-economic effects of sector-wide or even country-wide energy efficiency im-
provement (e.g., [101–104]; for further sources, see [98]). Most of these studies rely on
input–output analysis, with the findings based on net effects (counterfactual approach)
being more meaningful than those reporting gross effects [70,105]. These studies generally
coincide in their conclusions about the positive effects for employment and in terms of
GDP, with very few exceptions (e.g., models running with crowding out or model results
for first years after the investment; [106,107]). Some studies refer to past or ongoing in-
vestments [100,101], while others study address the future implementations of energy
efficiency policies (e.g., [108]). The latter approach applies to the models E3ME and GEM-
E3, which were used by the European Commission to assess the macroeconomic impacts
of energy efficiency policy [106,109]. E3ME is referred to as “a macro-econometric model,
based on a post-Keynesian demand-driven non-optimisation non-equilibrium framework,”
whereas GEM-E3 is a general equilibrium model [110]. Most E3ME and GEM-E3 model
runs show net benefits in terms of GDP and employment, but these are less positive for
some model runs representing higher ambition levels of energy efficiency improvement,
and they can then become negative in cases of self-financing (i.e. no borrowing, resulting
in “full crowding out” [106]).
Link to sufficiency strategies: Since EEM alone may not allow one to reach the energy
saving targets, there is increased attention for sufficiency strategies which concern the level
and/or the reduction of energy services [111]. In principle, EEPs lend themselves to be
expanded to sufficiency strategies.
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Appendix D.2 Drawbacks
Free-rider effects: Possibly the most widely quoted drawback of EEPs is the free-rider
effect. The extent of the free-rider effect depends on various parameters, e.g., the type of EE
measure; the subsidy level; and a number of characteristics of the beneficiaries, including
income, environmental attitude and risk and time preferences [112]. Not rarely, free-rider
effects are in the order of 50%, with some authors finding clearly higher values (up to
90% according to [113]; further studies quoted in [112]), while others present clearly lower
ones (12% according to [114]; around or below 20% in UK according to [115], but possibly
higher values in Germany’s KFW programme, likewise according to [115]). A higher level
of free-riding is typically found in EEPs addressed toward households as opposed to the
commercial and industrial sector.
Continuous adaption to markets and legislation: As discussed above, in the con-
text of strengths, EEPs can help to transform the market towards a more energy-efficient
portfolio. EEPs and similar energy policies are therefore sometimes referred to as “accel-
erators.” If, on the other hand, EEPs drive a market transformation process which would
autonomously anyway occur very soon afterwards, they are more unlikely to serve as
effective and cost-effective policy measures. To avoid this type of phenomenon and in
order to choose the right areas of energy demand (i.e., the areas where intervention really
matters), programme operators need to continuously screen the market and be well aware
of product trends (types of options and their cost-effectiveness), changes in legislation and
their implications (e.g., the Swiss ProKilowatt programme stopped funding heat pumps
for domestic hot water supply once these became mandatory to use according to revised
building codes [116]). In other words, programme operators should function as efficiently
as markets by anticipating developments, making strategic decisions about what to subsi-
dize and pulling out again as quickly as possible once support is no longer needed. This
implies great organisational effort, which incurs additional costs and can compromise the
EEP’s cost-effectiveness. At the same time, negligence on these matters also impairs the
cost-effectiveness. In addition, it requires a high level of professionalism and an agile body.
The latter is not a known feature of the reputations which public administrations have in
most countries, and similarly, large utilities are often slow at decision making and they may
lack flexibility. In order to remain effective, the rules under which EEPs operate need to be
periodically modified, which is not only a challenge for the operator but also for the EEP
applicants (in fact, the effort related to the preparation of an EEP tender as a consequence
of the complex rules is a reason why the Swiss ProKilowatt programme has received
less applications than desired, which in turn, limits the competitive character and calls
for further corrective measures (in particular the so-called 120% rule in the ProKilowatt
programme [116]). Experience is available on how to effectively and successfully manage
EEPs (see, e.g., [82], p. 63; [85], p. 15).
Metering energy efficiency is challenging: A general challenge of EE policies, which
is hence shared also by other measures apart from EEPs, is the fact that it is demanding to
measure the energy efficiency gains: while the output of a renewable energy installation can
be reliably established by means of a physical meter, quantification of the evolution of EE
requires a model-based, counterfactual approach (correcting for boundary conditions such
as changing energy prices) which is unavoidably subject to uncertainty. This becomes even
more challenging when policy measures overlap (e.g., pre-existing measures as opposed to
new measures), which is always the case in practice.
Conflicts of interest for utilities: For EEPs and EEOs operated by utilities in countries
with largely liberalised energy markets, there is a conflict of interest: the utilities’ economic
well-being is proportional to their sales and therefore increased energy efficiency results
in lower revenue. On the other hand, this can be addressed by decoupling policies which
allow revenues to be “decoupled” from sales, making it possible for utilities to receive
compensation for decreased sales (as a downside, this adds an administrative burden and
the associated costs) [117,118]. Furthermore, EEPs and EEOs somewhat reduce the utilities’
freedom of choice with regard to investments, which may ultimately reduce a utility’s
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associated earning opportunities, hence making it unattractive for utilities to invest in EE;
this barrier can be addressed by performance incentives for achieving energy efficiency
targets [117].
Risk of fraud: The presence of a large budget and the definitions of the rules according
to which it is ultimately spent imply a risk of fraud, not only for White Certificates but
more generally for EEPs.
Fuel poverty: Ratepayer-funded EEPs may be criticised for exacerbating fuel poverty,
whereas government-led programmes funded by tax revenue can be designed to avoid
undesired distributive effects. On the other hand, over the years, the EEPs cover most of the
customers who then also benefit from the programmes. EEPs (including ratepayer-funded
programmes) can further mitigate distributive effects by dedicating an above average
budget share to low-income households (many EEPs do so). Finally, the increase in energy
prices helps to limit the rebound effect and is an incentive for saving energy.
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